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Abstract:	  	  A	  finer-­‐grained	  delineation	  of	  a	  given	  explanandum	  reveals	  a	  nexus	  of	  closely	  related	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations,	  complementing	  one	  another	  in	  ways	  that	  yield	  further	  explanatory	  traction	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  question.	  By	  taking	  a	  narrower	  construal	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  causal	  explanation,	  a	  new	  class	  of	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  pops	  into	  focus;	  Lange’s	  ([2013])	  characterization	  of	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  cover	  these.	  This	  new	  class	  of	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  is	  illustrated	  with	  the	  Lotka-­‐Volterra	  equations.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  distinct	  ways	  those	  equations	  might	  hold	  of	  a	  system,	  one	  of	  which	  yields	  straightforwardly	  causal	  explanations,	  but	  the	  other	  of	  which	  yields	  explanations	  that	  are	  distinctively	  mathematical	  in	  terms	  of	  nomological	  strength.	  In	  the	  first,	  one	  first	  picks	  out	  a	  system	  or	  class	  of	  systems,	  finds	  that	  the	  equations	  hold	  in	  a	  causal-­‐explanatory	  way;	  in	  the	  second,	  one	  starts	  with	  the	  equations	  and	  explanations	  that	  must	  apply	  to	  any	  system	  of	  which	  the	  equations	  hold,	  and	  only	  then	  turns	  to	  the	  world	  to	  see	  of	  what,	  if	  any,	  systems	  it	  does	  in	  fact	  hold.	  Using	  this	  new	  way	  in	  which	  a	  model	  might	  hold	  of	  a	  system,	  I	  highlight	  four	  specific	  avenues	  by	  which	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  can	  complement	  one	  another.	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1. Introduction	  Causal	  explanation	  has	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  intense	  work	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  which	  makes	  it	  useful	  to	  consider	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  boundary	  between	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations.	  I	  will	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  what	  we	  see	  when	  we	  do	  a	  fine-­‐grained	  examination	  of	  that	  boundary.	  What	  we	  find	  is	  that	  many	  explananda	  are	  more	  like	  clusters	  of	  phenomena:	  the	  original	  phenomenon	  for	  which	  an	  explanation	  was	  sought	  breaks	  into	  a	  variety	  of	  more	  precisely	  delineated	  phenomena	  that,	  when	  taken	  together	  with	  the	  right	  interrelationships	  between	  them,	  together	  constitute	  the	  explanatory	  cluster	  that	  was	  the	  original	  phenomenon.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this,	  the	  more	  clearly	  we	  specify	  an	  explanandum	  in	  question,	  the	  more	  we	  reveal	  closely	  related	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  for	  slight	  variations	  in	  the	  formulation.	  Small	  changes	  are	  just	  enough	  to	  rock	  us	  back	  and	  forth	  across	  the	  distinction	  between	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanation,	  which	  is	  helpful	  to	  understand	  the	  boundaries	  between	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanation	  share	  while	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  precisely	  specified	  explananda.	  The	  tendency	  to	  conceive	  of	  scientific	  explanation	  solely	  or	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  causal	  explanation	  results	  in	  part	  from	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  causal	  structure	  in	  the	  world.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  are	  many	  relationships	  that	  can	  serve	  an	  explanatory	  role	  that	  are	  not	  causal.	  Mathematical	  relationships,	  part-­‐whole	  relationships,	  and	  even	  relationships	  in	  a	  taxonomy	  can	  explain	  by	  situating	  the	  explanandum	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  explanans	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  relationship	  that	  is	  not	  straightforwardly	  causal.	  Explanations	  might	  seem	  to	  be	  causal,	  or	  mostly	  causal,	  if	  we	  are	  insufficiently	  ‘focused’	  in	  terms	  of	  specifying	  which	  explanandum	  is	  at	  stake.	  But,	  once	  we	  clarify	  exactly	  what	  is	  being	  explained,	  and	  by	  what	  it	  is	  being	  explained,	  then	  a	  host	  of	  non-­‐causal	  relationships	  pop	  into	  focus	  as	  key	  to	  explanation,	  situated	  closely	  all	  around	  causal	  explanation(s).	  Slight	  reformulations	  in	  the	  explanandum	  will	  change	  the	  relevant	  explanation(s)	  from	  causal	  to	  non-­‐causal	  and	  back	  again.	  When	  considering	  scientific	  explanation,	  we	  are	  overwhelmingly	  often	  in	  the	  territory	  where	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  fall	  closely	  together.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  specific	  kind	  of	  non-­‐causal	  scientific	  explanation	  being	  considered,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  multitude	  of	  causal	  explanations	  just	  next	  door,	  so	  that	  small	  reformulations	  of	  what	  precisely	  is	  being	  explained	  will	  shift	  the	  explanans	  from	  non-­‐causal	  to	  causal.	  	  I’ll	  be	  using	  the	  term	  ‘non-­‐causal’	  as	  a	  catchall	  term	  for	  any	  kind	  of	  explanation	  that	  isn’t	  causal.	  This	  negative	  characterization	  of	  non-­‐causal	  in	  terms	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of	  what	  it	  is	  not	  results	  in	  a	  wildly	  heterogeneous	  category.	  This	  sheds	  light	  on	  both	  causal	  explanation	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanation	  in	  terms	  of	  where	  they	  leave	  off,	  each	  for	  the	  other.	  I	  will	  consider	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  non-­‐causal	  explanation,	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  an	  important	  proper	  subset	  of	  causal	  versus	  non-­‐causal	  explanations.	  	  This	  paper	  offers	  several	  new	  points	  about	  causal	  explanations,	  how	  explanations	  can	  complement,	  and	  a	  distinction	  between	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  model	  might	  hold	  of	  a	  system	  such	  that	  it	  changes	  the	  character	  of	  the	  resulting	  explanations	  from	  causal	  to	  mathematical.	  I	  do	  so	  in	  the	  service	  of	  also	  making	  a	  broader	  point	  about	  causal	  versus	  non-­‐causal	  explanation,	  where	  my	  goal	  is	  not	  to	  offer	  a	  novel	  account	  of	  that	  distinction.	  The	  materials	  to	  characterize	  the	  boundaries	  where	  causal	  explanations	  leave	  off	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  begin	  are	  already	  around,	  in	  my	  view,	  and	  simply	  need	  to	  be	  dusted	  off	  and	  redeployed.	  With	  this	  aim,	  I	  make	  use	  of	  some	  of	  the	  classic	  features	  of	  explanation,	  ones	  which	  re-­‐appear	  is	  discussions	  over	  the	  last	  fifty	  years	  even	  while	  specific	  accounts	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  explanation	  have	  changed.	  The	  points	  made	  here	  will	  be	  applicable	  in	  any	  particular	  account	  of	  explanation,	  causal	  or	  not	  –	  this	  includes	  new	  mechanistic	  explanation,	  interventionist	  causal	  explanation,	  distinctively	  mathematical	  scientific	  explanations,	  and	  more.	  	  The	  approach	  offered	  in	  this	  paper	  for	  causal	  versus	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  will	  have	  consequences	  for	  further	  questions	  such	  as	  the	  explanatory	  role	  that	  mathematics	  and	  mathematically	  formulated	  laws	  may	  play	  in	  explanation	  (consider	  especially	  Pincock	  [2012],	  [2014];	  Saatsi	  [2011]),	  the	  role	  of	  models	  in	  explanation	  (Sterrett	  [2002];	  Bokulich	  [2008]),	  and	  alternative	  forms	  of	  explanation	  that	  are	  not	  straightforwardly	  causal	  (Batterman	  [2002],	  [2010];	  Batterman	  and	  Rice	  [2014];	  Reutlinger	  [2013]).	  My	  discussion	  here	  should	  be	  useful	  to	  a	  broad	  swath	  of	  these	  other,	  more	  specifically	  focused,	  discussions	  about	  particular	  ways	  in	  which	  distinct	  explanatory	  techniques	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  or	  deployed.	  For	  instance,	  Skow	  ([2014])	  has	  argued	  that	  existing	  examples	  of	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  are	  unconvincing,	  in	  that	  they	  can	  be	  accommodated	  within	  causal	  explanation.	  On	  the	  view	  offered	  in	  this	  paper,	  the	  unconvincing	  examples	  indicated	  by	  Skow	  look	  more	  like	  insufficiently	  well-­‐clarified	  explananda,	  such	  that	  further	  clarification	  would	  reveal	  both	  that	  he	  has	  identified	  genuinely	  causal	  explanations,	  and	  that	  the	  original	  examples	  could	  be	  reformulated	  in	  slightly	  different	  ways	  to	  retain	  their	  non-­‐causal	  character.	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A	  main	  take-­‐away	  message	  will	  be	  the	  way	  in	  which	  philosophical	  fruit	  is	  borne	  of	  a	  increased	  focus	  on	  precision	  and	  clarity	  in	  stipulating	  what,	  precisely,	  is	  getting	  explained,	  and	  what,	  precisely,	  is	  doing	  the	  explaining,	  and	  what,	  precisely,	  the	  explanatory	  relation	  between	  explanans	  and	  explanadum	  is	  taken	  to	  be.	  Simply	  fine-­‐tuning	  our	  focus	  in	  characterizing	  explananda	  will	  have	  an	  enormous	  benefit	  in	  allowing	  a	  rich	  array	  of	  explanatory	  techniques	  and	  relations	  to	  pop	  into	  view.	  	  	  
2. Delineating	  the	  Boundaries	  of	  Causal	  Explanation	  There	  are	  three	  main	  elements	  in	  any	  explanation.	  The	  details	  about	  what	  can	  fill	  these	  roles	  will	  vary	  depending	  on	  other	  commitments,	  such	  as	  an	  ontic	  versus	  propositional	  construal	  of	  explanation.	  But	  all	  accounts	  agree	  on	  these	  general	  features.	  The	  explanandum	  is	  that	  which	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  explanation.	  The	  explanation	  also	  includes	  an	  explanans,	  and	  some	  relationship	  or	  situation	  between	  the	  explanans	  and	  explanandum.	  The	  explanation	  explains	  by	  situating	  the	  explanandum	  to	  the	  explanans	  via	  that	  relationship.	  An	  explanandum	  is	  a	  target	  for	  explanation:	  anything	  that	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  possible	  to	  provide	  an	  explanation	  for.	  While	  this	  might	  seem	  unhelpfully	  vague,	  it	  reflects	  the	  wild	  heterogeneity	  of	  targets	  for	  explanation	  that	  we	  actually	  find,	  in	  the	  sciences	  and	  beyond.	  Why	  we	  identify	  particular	  targets	  as	  worth	  explaining	  is	  an	  important	  question	  I	  set	  aside	  for	  this	  paper,	  and	  instead	  start	  from	  the	  point	  once	  a	  target	  for	  explanation	  has	  already	  been	  identified.	  An	  explanation	  need	  not	  be	  total,	  or	  even	  particularly	  satisfying,	  to	  count	  as	  explanatory.	  Weak,	  partial,	  even	  barely	  helpful	  explanations	  are	  still	  explanatory	  of	  something,	  even	  if	  they	  leave	  much	  else	  unexplained.	  	  
2.1	  Why	  construe	  causal	  explanation	  narrowly?	  	  The	  Land	  of	  Explanation	  
versus	  grain	  focusing	  Compare	  a	  narrow	  versus	  broad	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation:	  
Narrow:	  Any	  explanation	  that	  provides	  parts	  of	  the	  explanandum’s	  causal	  history,	  including	  contextually	  relevant	  features	  that	  might	  not	  be	  in	  direct	  causal	  past,	  as	  explanans	  Or:	  The	  connection	  between	  explanans	  and	  explanandum	  is	  a	  causal	  relationship(s)	  	  
Broad:	  Any	  explanation	  that	  explains	  by	  virtue	  of	  situating	  an	  explanandum	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  in	  the	  world	  Or:	  any	  of	  the	  explanans,	  explanandum,	  or	  connection	  between	  them	  involves	  a	  causal	  relationship(s)	  or	  relata	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The	  key	  difference	  is	  that	  on	  the	  narrow	  construal,	  only	  those	  explanations	  where	  the	  relationship	  connecting	  explanans	  and	  explanandum	  is	  causal	  will	  thereby	  be	  causal	  explanations.	  There	  might	  be	  causal	  relationships	  that	  are	  themselves	  the	  explanandum,	  or	  that	  are	  the	  explanans,	  but	  where	  the	  relationship	  connecting	  explanans	  and	  explanandum	  does	  not	  involve	  tracing	  out	  a	  causal	  history,	  and	  which	  are	  thereby	  non-­‐causal	  explanations.	  On	  the	  broad	  conception,	  any	  explanation	  that	  has	  a	  causal	  element	  anywhere	  –	  a	  causal	  relationship	  or	  causal	  relata	  as	  the	  explanans,	  explanandum,	  or	  connection	  between	  them	  –	  will	  count	  as	  a	  causal	  explanation.	  On	  the	  narrow	  construal,	  there	  might	  be	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  of	  causal	  structures,	  for	  instance,	  whereas	  on	  the	  broad	  construal	  any	  such	  explanation	  would	  have	  to	  count	  as	  causal.	  The	  narrower	  our	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation,	  the	  more	  useful	  it	  is	  for	  identifying	  and	  analyzing	  particular	  instances	  of	  causal	  explanation	  that	  we	  find	  in	  the	  sciences.	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  say	  something	  significant	  by	  calling	  a	  particular	  explanation	  ‘causal’.	  The	  more	  broadly	  we	  construe	  causal	  explanation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  less	  significance	  is	  involved	  in	  labeling	  a	  particular	  explanation	  as	  a	  causal	  explanation.	  At	  the	  extreme	  end	  of	  a	  broad	  construal,	  causal	  explanation	  merely	  means	  nothing	  other	  than	  explanation.	  This	  prevents	  us	  from	  being	  able	  to	  say	  anything	  about	  the	  distinctive	  character	  of	  causal	  explanation,	  and	  runs	  a	  host	  of	  different	  explanatory	  techniques	  together	  into	  a	  muddy	  wash.	  	  On	  the	  broad	  view,	  one	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  think	  of	  the	  boundary	  that	  divides	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  like	  provinces	  in	  the	  Land	  of	  Explanation.	  The	  provincial	  view	  construes	  an	  entire	  domain	  to	  be	  explained	  as	  in	  one	  or	  another	  realm	  of	  explanation,	  be	  it	  causal	  or	  non-­‐causal.	  The	  boundaries	  between	  them	  take	  you	  entirely	  out	  of	  one	  kind	  of	  explanation	  and	  entirely	  into	  another	  realm	  of	  explanation.	  The	  border	  strictly	  divides	  them	  from	  one	  another.	  One	  might	  even	  think	  they	  occasionally	  have	  border	  skirmishes,	  fighting	  over	  control	  of	  a	  given	  explanation	  as	  belonging	  in	  one	  province	  rather	  than	  another.	  Some	  explanations	  might	  be	  hard	  to	  locate,	  in	  terms	  of	  finding	  the	  right	  land	  in	  which	  they	  live.	  	  This	  is	  a	  view	  I	  will	  argue	  we	  should	  entirely	  reject,	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  different	  metaphor	  that	  goes	  along	  with	  the	  narrow	  construal.	  Consider	  an	  old-­‐fashioned	  darkroom	  enlarger	  used	  for	  printing	  back	  and	  white	  photographs	  from	  film.	  Once	  the	  image	  to	  be	  printed	  looks	  sharp	  enough	  to	  the	  naked	  eye,	  one	  can	  still	  improve	  the	  picture	  quality	  by	  using	  a	  grain	  focuser.	  Using	  it	  to	  make	  the	  individual	  grains	  of	  silver	  visible,	  one	  usually	  sees	  a	  gently	  variegated	  smear	  of	  greys,	  black,	  and	  whites,	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continuously	  shading	  into	  one	  another.	  Slight	  additional	  adjustments	  with	  the	  knob,	  all	  within	  the	  range	  of	  what	  looked	  sharp	  to	  the	  naked	  eye,	  result	  in	  a	  sudden	  pop	  into	  focus	  of	  the	  individual	  grains	  of	  silver	  on	  the	  film.1	  With	  the	  grain	  enlarger,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  the	  image	  really	  is	  composed	  of	  distinct	  dots	  or	  grains,	  some	  larger	  or	  smaller,	  often	  with	  irregular	  edges,	  all	  nestled	  up	  closely	  and	  together	  composing	  the	  image.	  	  This	  metaphor	  results	  in	  a	  very	  different	  picture	  of	  how	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  fit	  together.	  Explanations	  might	  seem	  to	  be	  causal,	  or	  mostly	  causal,	  if	  we	  squint,	  or	  if	  we	  are	  insufficiently	  ‘focused’	  in	  terms	  of	  specifying	  which	  explanadum	  is	  at	  stake.	  But,	  once	  we	  clarify	  exactly	  what	  is	  being	  explained,	  and	  by	  what	  it	  is	  being	  explained,	  then	  a	  host	  of	  non-­‐causal	  relationships	  pop	  into	  focus,	  situated	  all	  around	  the	  causal	  explanation(s).	  Slight	  reformulations	  in	  the	  explanandum	  will	  change	  the	  relevant	  explanation(s)	  from	  causal	  to	  non-­‐causal	  and	  back	  again.	  The	  tendency	  to	  conceive	  of	  scientific	  explanation	  solely	  or	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  causal	  explanation	  results	  in	  part	  from	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  causal	  structure	  in	  the	  world.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  specific	  kind	  of	  non-­‐causal	  scientific	  explanation	  being	  considered,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  multitude	  of	  causal	  explanations	  just	  next	  door,	  in	  that	  small	  reformulations	  of	  what	  precisely	  is	  being	  explained	  will	  shift	  the	  explanans	  from	  non-­‐causal	  to	  causal.	  	  The	  metaphor	  of	  grain	  focusing	  thus	  means	  using	  specificity	  in	  delineating	  given	  explananda.	  Shifting	  the	  way	  in	  which	  an	  explanandum	  is	  formulated,	  even	  subtly,	  is	  overwhelmingly	  likely	  to	  change	  the	  required	  explanans	  enough	  to	  skew	  the	  result	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  causation.	  There	  are	  always	  some	  causal	  explanations	  of	  something	  in	  the	  vicinity,	  for	  almost	  every	  explanandum;	  but	  they	  may	  not	  be	  causal	  explanations	  of	  the	  original	  explanandum.	  
2.2	  Reasons	  to	  narrow	  the	  scope	  of	  causal	  explanation	  A	  useful	  counterpoint	  is	  Lange’s	  ([2013])	  construal	  of	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations.	  He	  takes	  up	  the	  question	  of	  what	  makes	  some	  scientific	  explanations	  distinctively	  mathematical	  rather	  than	  causal.	  The	  explanations	  he	  discusses	  are	  not	  simply	  mathematical	  explanations,	  where	  one	  bit	  of	  math	  explains	  another,	  nor	  are	  they	  simply	  explanations	  where	  mathematical	  representations	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Note	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  physical	  size	  scale	  is	  not	  what	  drives	  this	  metaphor;	  it	  is	  not	  that	  zooming	  in	  to	  a	  microscopic	  size	  reveals	  better	  explanations.	  Rather,	  the	  magnification	  is	  analogous	  to	  conceptual	  precision	  in	  formulating	  the	  explananda	  and	  explanans.	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involved.	  They	  are	  scientific	  in	  that	  they	  are	  about	  explananda	  in	  the	  world,	  but	  involve	  mathematical	  relationships	  in	  the	  explanation	  in	  a	  way	  that	  goes	  beyond	  mere	  mathematical	  representation.	  Lange’s	  characterization	  of	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  starts	  with	  what	  he	  takes	  causal	  explanation	  to	  be.	  ‘I	  will	  adopt	  a	  broad	  conception	  of	  what	  makes	  an	  explanation	  ‘causal’:	  it	  explains	  by	  virtue	  of	  describing	  the	  contextually	  relevant	  features	  of	  the	  result’s	  causal	  history	  or,	  more	  broadly,	  of	  the	  world’s	  network	  of	  causal	  relations’	  (Lange	  [2013],	  p.	  493).	  He	  cites	  the	  following	  passage	  of	  Salmon	  as	  evidence	  of	  Salmon	  holding	  that	  all	  explanations	  are	  causal,	  and	  adopts	  a	  broad	  reading	  of	  Salmon’s	  description	  of	  explanation.	  ‘To	  give	  scientific	  explanations	  is	  to	  show	  how	  events	  and	  statistical	  regularities	  fit	  into	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  world’	  (Salmon	  [1977],	  quoted	  in	  Lange	  [2013],	  p.	  487).	  This	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation	  is,	  as	  he	  puts	  it,	  broad.	  This	  makes	  sense	  in	  light	  of	  Lange’s	  task	  of	  distinguishing	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  from	  causal	  explanations.	  A	  more	  generous	  definition	  of	  causal	  makes	  his	  argumentative	  task	  more	  difficult	  and	  the	  resulting	  conclusion	  more	  compelling.	  However,	  I’ll	  urge	  adoption	  of	  the	  narrow	  rather	  than	  broad	  construal	  for	  general	  use:	  the	  original	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation	  is	  so	  broad	  that	  it	  dilutes	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  category	  of	  causal	  explanation	  by	  dramatically	  reducing	  the	  commonality	  between	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  explanations	  that	  all	  thus	  qualify	  as	  causal.2	  Why	  should	  the	  narrow	  rather	  than	  broad	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation	  be	  adopted?	  There	  are	  several	  reasons.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  we	  can	  assent	  to	  Salmon’s	  description	  of	  explanation	  as	  situating	  the	  explanandum	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  in	  the	  world,	  without	  thereby	  committing	  to	  all	  such	  situatings	  being	  
causal	  situatings.	  For	  non-­‐causal	  situatings	  of	  explananda	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relationships,	  the	  explanatory	  work	  is	  not	  done	  through	  causal	  relationships	  –	  it	  is	  not	  by	  tracing	  along	  the	  pathways	  of	  the	  causal	  network	  that	  the	  explanandum	  gets	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Skow	  ([2014])	  offers	  a	  characterization	  of	  causal	  explanation	  that	  involves	  a	  broad	  versus	  narrow	  distinction,	  but	  his	  concern	  is	  more	  about	  the	  totality	  of	  explanation:	  while	  he	  rejects	  an	  overly	  narrow	  view	  of	  causal	  explanation,	  he	  takes	  that	  to	  be	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  causal	  explanation	  must	  be	  complete,	  total,	  or	  otherwise	  sufficient	  to	  count	  as	  explanatory.	  In	  this	  regard,	  both	  Skow	  and	  I	  agree	  that	  a	  causal	  explanation	  can	  be	  both	  causal	  and	  explanatory	  without	  explaining	  the	  totality	  of	  an	  explanans’	  past	  causal	  history.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  he	  would	  endorse	  the	  construal	  of	  narrowness	  I	  offer	  here.	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explained.	  Consider	  ‘new	  mechanism’	  explanations	  (Andersen	  [2014a]	  and	  [2014b]).	  A	  mechanism	  can	  explain	  a	  phenomenon	  when	  that	  phenomenon	  is	  the	  product	  of	  the	  organized	  causal	  chain	  at	  the	  termination	  conditions	  of	  the	  mechanism:	  this	  would	  be	  a	  causal	  explanation	  on	  the	  narrow	  and	  broad	  construals	  both.	  A	  mechanism	  can	  also	  explain	  when	  it	  gives	  rise	  to	  or	  constitutes	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained:	  this	  clearly	  situates	  the	  explanandum	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations,	  since	  a	  mechanism	  just	  is	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  recurrent	  organizes	  causal	  chain	  in	  that	  network.	  On	  the	  broad	  construal,	  this	  would	  also	  be	  a	  causal	  explanation,	  just	  like	  the	  first.	  But	  on	  the	  narrow	  construal,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  constitutive	  rather	  than	  causal	  explanation.	  It	  is	  non-­‐causal	  even	  though	  there	  are	  clearly	  causal	  relationships	  and	  relata	  involved	  in	  the	  explanation;	  it	  is	  the	  special	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  mechanism	  that	  is	  the	  explanans.	  But	  the	  connection	  between	  explanandum	  and	  explanans	  is	  one	  of	  constitution,	  not	  causation.	  The	  broad	  construal	  is	  unable	  to	  mark	  this	  difference.	  Another	  reason	  to	  adopt	  the	  narrow	  construal	  concerns	  is	  that	  is	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  accurate	  portrayal	  of	  the	  diversity	  of	  explanatory	  practices,	  especially	  in	  the	  sciences.	  By	  allowing	  any	  explanation	  involving	  causation	  in	  any	  way	  to	  count	  as	  causal,	  we	  smear	  together	  a	  host	  of	  distinct	  but	  closely	  related	  explananda	  and	  connecting	  relationships.	  Maintaining	  our	  explanatory	  resources	  in	  terms	  of	  distinct	  types	  of	  connections	  that	  can	  be	  explanatorily	  deployed	  is	  necessary	  to	  accurately	  describe	  and	  distinguish	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  species	  of	  explanations	  found	  in	  the	  sciences.	  A	  third	  reason	  involves	  a	  stronger	  way	  in	  which	  two	  kinds	  of	  explanations	  might	  be	  related.	  While	  more	  precise	  specifications	  of	  explananda	  may	  often	  enough	  yield	  two	  closely	  related	  but	  distinct	  explananda,	  that	  is	  not	  always	  or	  necessarily	  the	  case:	  sometimes	  there	  may	  be	  more	  than	  one	  kind	  of	  explanation	  available	  for	  a	  single	  well-­‐specified	  explanandum.	  An	  explanation	  in	  which	  the	  explanandum	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  explanans	  is	  another	  example	  of	  a	  non-­‐causal	  situating	  in	  the	  causal	  network.	  That	  same	  explanandum	  could	  be	  given	  an	  alternative	  causal	  explanation,	  in	  contrast,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  causally	  upstream	  portions	  of	  the	  network	  rather	  than	  by	  what	  constitutes	  it.	  These	  are	  two	  distinct	  explanatory	  perspectives	  on	  the	  same	  explanandum,	  which	  can	  be	  extraordinarily	  illuminating.	  Losing	  focus	  on	  these	  distinct	  ways	  of	  situating	  something	  in	  the	  causal	  network	  means	  losing	  the	  ability	  to	  understand	  the	  full	  range	  of	  existing	  explanations	  and	  how	  they	  fit	  together.	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Finally,	  adopting	  the	  narrow	  construal	  encourages	  good	  practice	  in	  terms	  of	  formulating	  explananda	  in	  a	  sufficiently	  precise	  way.	  As	  we’ll	  see	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  rocking	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  slightly	  different	  formulations	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained	  results	  in	  shifting	  between	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  for	  the	  closely	  related	  but	  non-­‐identical	  explananda.	  When	  considering	  scientific	  explanation,	  we	  are	  overwhelmingly	  often	  in	  the	  territory	  where	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  fall	  closely	  together.	  If	  we	  accept	  Salmon’s	  view	  that	  scientific	  explanations	  involve	  situating	  explananda	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  in	  the	  world,	  we	  are	  always	  in	  the	  immediate	  vicinity	  of	  causal	  relationships.	  This	  means	  it	  is	  deceptively	  easy	  to	  phrase	  explananda	  in	  vague	  ways	  that	  make	  it	  appear	  causal,	  by	  latching	  onto	  whatever	  causal	  relationships	  are	  in	  the	  vicinity.	  If	  we	  switch	  what,	  precisely,	  is	  getting	  explained,	  we	  thereby	  switch	  what,	  precisely,	  can	  explain	  it.	  Fudging	  the	  explanandum	  will	  almost	  always	  result	  in	  apparently	  causal	  explanations.	  More	  precise	  formulation	  of	  explananda,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  will	  bring	  into	  focus	  the	  non-­‐causal	  relationships	  nestled	  nearby,	  and	  will	  highlight	  the	  details	  in	  those	  explananda	  that	  result	  in	  shifts	  between	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations.	  	  
3. Broadening	  the	  Scope	  of	  Mathematical	  Explanation	  Lange	  identifies	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  by	  the	  extra	  modal	  force	  they	  have	  compared	  to	  the	  necessity	  associated	  with	  causal	  laws.	  He	  illustrates	  this	  with	  the	  example	  of	  a	  mother	  trying	  to	  divide	  twenty-­‐three	  strawberries	  evenly	  among	  three	  children	  without	  cutting	  any	  berries.	  There	  is	  no	  way	  to	  do	  this,	  and	  the	  explanation,	  that	  twenty-­‐three	  is	  not	  evenly	  divisible	  by	  three,	  puts	  a	  constraint	  on	  any	  causal	  laws.	  There	  are	  no	  causal	  laws,	  actual	  or	  possible,	  such	  that	  they	  would	  result	  in	  a	  causal	  process	  by	  which	  twenty-­‐three	  strawberries	  could	  be	  evenly	  divided.	  The	  modal	  force	  of	  the	  explanation,	  therefore,	  must	  come	  from	  something	  other	  than	  a	  causal	  relation	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  from	  the	  mathematical	  relation.	  The	  class	  of	  explanations	  Lange	  thus	  identifies	  are	  those	  that	  apply	  anywhere,	  in	  any	  possible	  world.	  There	  is	  no	  causal	  process,	  under	  any	  circumstances	  anywhere,	  such	  that	  it	  could	  involve	  an	  even	  division	  of	  twenty-­‐three	  by	  three.	  No	  physical	  laws	  or	  facts	  are	  presupposed	  or	  utilized.	  These	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  are	  indeed	  quite	  interesting	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  explanatory	  relationship	  connecting	  explanandum	  and	  explanans,	  which	  results	  in	  a	  degree	  of	  necessity	  higher	  than	  any	  causal	  laws	  could	  achieve.	  It	  is	  striking	  to	  find	  explanations	  of	  physical	  events	  that	  involve	  purely	  mathematical	  relationships	  as	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key	  to	  the	  explanation	  (this	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  role	  mathematics	  plays	  when	  causal	  relationships	  are	  represented	  mathematically,	  or	  even	  when	  arguably	  non-­‐causal	  physical	  laws	  in	  mathematical	  form	  are	  involved).	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  show	  how	  some	  of	  the	  extra	  ‘space’	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  explanation	  opened	  up	  by	  a	  narrow	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation,	  in	  combination	  with	  an	  expanded	  version	  of	  Lange’s	  criterion,	  reveals	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  additional	  set	  of	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations.	  These	  are	  explanations	  have	  a	  weaker	  degree	  of	  necessity	  than	  the	  very	  strongest	  degree	  of	  necessity	  associated	  with	  claims	  such	  as	  ‘twenty-­‐three	  is	  not	  evenly	  divisible	  by	  three’,	  but	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  modally	  stronger	  than	  ordinary	  causal	  relationships.	  They	  constrain	  possible	  causal	  relationships,	  but	  only	  for	  properly	  picked-­‐out	  subsets	  of	  the	  causal	  network	  and	  with	  sets	  of	  conditions	  in	  place	  that	  might	  include	  constraints	  on,	  for	  instance,	  what	  the	  physical	  laws	  must	  be	  for	  the	  explanations	  to	  hold.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  these	  subsets	  are	  picked	  out,	  however,	  means	  that	  once	  we	  have	  found	  them,	  we	  can	  give	  explanations	  about	  their	  causal	  structure	  that	  are	  distinctively	  mathematical,	  rather	  than	  simply	  causal.	  Once	  again,	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  cannot	  be	  identified	  simply	  by	  having	  a	  mathematical	  form.	  There	  are	  many	  straightforwardly	  causal	  relationships	  that	  can	  be	  represented	  mathematically	  without	  thereby	  rendering	  them	  mathematical	  rather	  than	  causal.	  The	  key	  feature	  ought	  to	  involve	  mathematical	  relationships	  as	  the,	  or	  part	  of	  the,	  connection	  between	  explanandum	  and	  explanans.	  Distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  are	  such	  that,	  given	  some	  set	  of	  conditions	  [A],	  then	  the	  connection	  between	  explanandum	  and	  explanans	  is	  mathematical	  in	  character,	  such	  that	  the	  resulting	  explanation	  involves	  a	  modal	  force	  stronger	  than	  that	  of	  causal	  generalizations.	  This	  just	  is	  Lange’s	  characterization,	  preceded	  by	  the	  stipulation	  that	  some	  set	  of	  conditions	  must	  hold;	  these	  conditions	  concern	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  explanans	  and	  explanandum.	  Instead	  of	  asserting	  that	  the	  mathematical	  modal	  character	  holds	  (call	  that	  B),	  it	  asserts	  a	  conditional:	  If	  [A],	  then	  [B].	  For	  the	  examples	  Lange	  identifies,	  the	  conditions	  hold	  vacuously,	  or	  are	  trivially	  fulfilled	  –	  no	  conditions	  must	  be	  met	  for	  twenty-­‐three	  to	  not	  be	  evenly	  divisible	  by	  three.	  What	  about	  nontrivial	  conditions?	  One	  important	  way,	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  central	  ways,	  to	  cash	  out	  what	  those	  conditions	  are	  that	  must	  be	  met	  for	  a	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanation	  to	  result,	  concerns	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘holding	  of’.	  When	  a	  mathematical	  equation	  or	  set	  of	  equations	  holds	  of	  the	  world	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  it	  is	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the	  mathematical	  relationship(s)	  doing	  the	  explanatory	  work,	  even	  though	  they	  are	  representing	  causal	  relationship(s).	  	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  hold	  of	  the	  world	  in	  different	  ways?	  Since	  I’ll	  be	  using	  a	  model-­‐based	  example	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  consider	  this	  question	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  it	  means	  for	  a	  model	  to	  hold,	  or	  fail	  to	  hold,	  of	  a	  particular	  system	  in	  the	  world.	  This	  is	  a	  rich	  topic	  for	  discussion,	  on	  which	  this	  paper	  will	  only	  briefly	  touch.	  In	  general,	  it	  means	  that	  the	  model	  is	  applicable	  to	  the	  system,	  such	  that	  elements	  within	  the	  model	  provide	  a	  sufficiently	  veridical	  representation	  of	  parts	  of	  the	  system	  thus	  represented.	  It	  might	  also	  correctly	  describe	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  system	  (although,	  to	  be	  clear,	  it	  need	  not).	  The	  model	  holds	  of	  the	  system	  just	  in	  case	  the	  system	  is	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  systems	  to	  which	  the	  model	  can	  even	  be	  applied,	  and	  that	  application	  yields	  at	  least	  some	  degree	  of	  fit	  between	  the	  model	  as	  a	  representational	  device	  and	  the	  actual	  system	  in	  the	  world.	  Holding	  of	  can	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  degree:	  a	  model	  can	  hold	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent,	  or	  it	  can	  hold	  of	  one	  system	  more	  than	  it	  holds	  of	  another,	  even	  while	  holding	  of	  both	  above	  some	  level.	  This	  is	  vague	  and	  broad,	  but	  requires	  as	  few	  philosophical	  assumptions	  as	  possible.	  To	  say	  that	  a	  model	  holds	  of	  a	  particular	  system,	  then,	  is	  a	  situating	  per	  Salmon.	  Since	  the	  world	  is	  densely	  packed	  with	  causal	  relationships,	  this	  is	  a	  situating	  of	  the	  model	  in	  the	  causal	  network	  of	  the	  world.	  It	  lines	  up	  the	  model	  and	  a	  proper	  subset	  of	  the	  world,	  conceptually	  superimposing	  the	  former	  over	  the	  latter	  to	  show	  how	  it	  fits	  there.	  To	  say	  that	  a	  model	  holds	  of	  some	  part	  of	  the	  network	  is	  not	  to	  make	  a	  causal	  claim.	  ‘Holding	  of’	  has	  the	  wrong	  relata	  to	  be	  causal,	  since	  one	  relatum	  is	  a	  chunk	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  one	  relatum	  is	  a	  representational	  device.	  	  There	  are	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  model	  might	  hold,	  or	  fail	  to	  hold,	  of	  any	  particular	  system.	  Some	  of	  these	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  model	  holds	  are	  not	  themselves	  explanatory	  –	  it	  is	  merely	  a	  representational	  relationship,	  with	  no	  added	  explanatory	  force	  of	  its	  own.	  But	  there	  are	  also	  times	  when	  it	  is	  explanatory	  simply	  to	  say	  that	  the	  model	  holds.	  Note	  that	  these	  are	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  might	  hold,	  not	  merely	  different	  degrees	  to	  which	  it	  might	  hold.	  Some	  of	  these	  ways	  of	  holding	  of	  a	  system	  yield	  a	  causal	  version	  of	  the	  model.	  Explanations	  using	  the	  model	  that	  holds	  in	  this	  way	  will	  be	  causal	  explanations.	  But	  there	  are	  ways	  a	  model	  might	  hold	  of	  a	  system	  such	  that	  explanations	  using	  the	  model	  are	  distinctively	  mathematical,	  modally	  stronger	  than	  merely	  causal	  ones.	  This	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  situating	  of	  a	  model	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  in	  the	  world	  that	  gives	  explanatory	  leverage	  on	  the	  system	  as	  an	  explanandum,	  but	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  causal,	  even	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though	  it	  is	  because	  of	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  system	  that	  the	  model	  holds	  of	  it.	  This	  will	  be	  clearer	  with	  an	  example.	  	  
4. Lotka-­Volterra:	  Same	  Model,	  Different	  Explanation	  Types	  My	  discussion	  so	  far	  has	  been	  rather	  abstract.	  A	  simplified	  version	  of	  the	  Lotka-­‐Volterra	  model	  serves	  as	  a	  useful	  illustration	  of	  how	  the	  same	  model	  can	  be	  deployed	  in	  causal	  and	  in	  non-­‐causal	  explanations,	  in	  how	  to	  find	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  that	  only	  hold	  when	  given	  conditions	  are	  met,	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  explanatory	  versus	  merely	  representational	  to	  say	  that	  the	  model	  holds	  of	  a	  system.	  This	  example	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  general	  advantage	  of	  the	  narrow	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation.	  
4.1	  General	  biocide	  in	  the	  Lotka-­Volterra	  model	  The	  equations	  of	  the	  simplified	  version	  of	  the	  Lotka-­‐Volterra	  model	  represent	  a	  predator	  and	  prey	  population	  over	  time	  as	  coupled	  harmonic	  oscillators.	  	  dV/dt	  =	  rV	  –	  (aV)P	  dP/dt	  =	  b(aV)P	  –	  mP	  	  where	  V	  represents	  number	  of	  prey,	  P	  number	  of	  predators,	  r	  prey	  growth	  rate,	  and	  m	  predator	  death	  rate.	  On	  the	  broad	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation,	  the	  Lotka-­‐Volterra	  (L-­‐V	  henceforth)	  equations	  provide	  causal	  explanations.	  Consider	  a	  recent	  description	  of	  the	  L-­‐V	  mathematical	  model:	  Predation	  is	  of	  great	  interest	  to	  ecologists	  because	  it	  often	  represents	  a	  force	  that	  keeps	  populations	  below	  their	  environments’	  carrying	  capacities.	  …	  [Theoretical	  ecologists]	  construct	  models	  to	  study	  the	  factors	  that	  control	  the	  maximum	  population	  size	  as	  well	  as	  the	  phase,	  amplitude,	  and	  
frequency	  of	  oscillations	  in	  the	  populations.	  (Weisberg	  [2012],	  p.	  10;	  bold	  added)	  Phrases	  or	  terms	  in	  bold	  involve	  thick	  causal	  terminology,	  such	  as	  ‘keeps’	  and	  ‘control’,	  as	  well	  as	  terminology	  that	  is	  not	  causal	  per	  se,	  but	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  or	  implicitly	  represents	  causal	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  factors	  that	  control	  the	  relevant	  oscillation	  parameters.	  The	  L-­‐V	  equations	  represent	  many	  kinds	  of	  causal	  relationships.	  Individual	  prey	  and	  predator	  organisms	  are	  born,	  eat,	  sometimes	  get	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eaten,	  reproduce,	  and	  die.	  Some	  of	  these	  are	  explicitly	  represented,	  like	  the	  predator	  death	  rate,	  while	  some	  influence	  a	  variable	  but	  are	  not	  directly	  represented,	  such	  as	  prey	  eating.	  Populations	  sizes	  grow	  or	  diminish	  over	  time;	  they	  causally	  interact	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  such	  as	  when	  a	  scarcity	  of	  prey	  making	  hunting	  harder.	  The	  size	  and	  rate	  at	  which	  each	  population	  grows	  is	  causally	  affected	  by	  the	  size	  and	  rate	  of	  which	  the	  other	  grows,	  or	  crashes.	  The	  predator-­‐prey	  systems	  represented	  in	  the	  model	  are	  rich	  in	  causal	  structure.	  3	  The	  Lotka-­‐Volterra	  model	  is	  a	  useful	  example	  because	  it	  is	  often	  utilized	  as	  a	  toy	  model	  to	  illustrate	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  population	  dynamics,	  in	  full	  awareness	  that	  few	  if	  any	  actual	  populations	  precisely	  mirror	  these	  dynamics.	  Now	  consider	  what	  Weisberg	  and	  Reisman	  ([2008])	  call	  the	  Volterra	  principle:	  any	  general	  biocide,	  something	  that	  indiscriminately	  kills	  both	  prey	  and	  predators,	  will	  result	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  ratio	  of	  prey	  to	  predators.	  This	  follows	  purely	  from	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  mathematics	  in	  terms	  of	  solutions	  to	  the	  equations	  for	  equilibrium	  values	  (in	  other	  words,	  not	  immediately	  upon	  introduction	  of	  the	  general	  biocide,	  but	  once	  the	  oscillations	  have	  stabilized	  with	  the	  new	  causal	  factor	  of	  the	  biocide),	  and	  for	  the	  stability	  of	  those	  equilibrium	  solutions	  to	  small	  perturbations	  in	  parameter	  values	  (Weisberg	  and	  Reisman	  [2008]).	  Consider:	  p	  =	  average	  predator	  population	  size/	  average	  prey	  population	  size	  p	  =	  rb/m	  	  Recall,	  r	  is	  prey	  reproduction	  rate	  and	  m	  is	  predator	  death	  rate.	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  general	  biocide,	  r	  goes	  down	  (i.e.	  prey	  are	  not	  reproducing	  as	  quickly);	  and	  m	  goes	  up	  (i.e.	  the	  predator	  death	  rate	  increases).	  Thus,	  a	  general	  biocide	  must	  decrease	  p:	  those	  factors	  changing	  just	  are	  changes	  to	  the	  average	  population	  sizes,	  so	  that	  predators	  over	  prey	  gets	  smaller,	  or,	  prey	  over	  predators	  gets	  larger.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  general	  biocide	  on	  both	  populations	  need	  not	  be	  equal	  or	  balanced	  in	  any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  There	  are	  extremely	  interesting	  question	  about	  getting	  from	  a	  welter	  of	  causal	  relationships	  to	  the	  spare	  mathematical	  lines	  in	  the	  model,	  though,	  such	  that	  the	  model	  might	  not	  be	  directly	  representing	  anything	  causal.	  There	  are	  different	  ways	  of	  summing	  across	  causal	  histories,	  some	  of	  which	  may	  yield	  higher	  level	  causal	  histories,	  and	  some	  of	  which	  may	  yield	  some	  other	  kind	  of	  relationship,	  one	  that	  is	  about	  causal	  relationships	  and	  constituted	  by	  but	  is	  not	  thereby	  itself	  causal.	  This	  connects	  to	  debates	  about	  drift	  as	  a	  causal	  force,	  or	  fitness	  as	  causal	  versus	  mathematical.	  Another	  question	  raised	  by	  the	  L-­‐V	  model	  worth	  exploring	  is	  how	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  a	  causal-­‐mechanical	  account	  and	  an	  interventionist	  account	  of	  causation	  seem	  to	  yield	  different	  answers	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  summed	  set	  of	  causal	  trajectories	  is	  itself	  causal.	  These	  questions	  are	  left	  to	  the	  side	  for	  this	  paper.	  
	   14	  
particular	  way.	  By	  definition,	  a	  general	  biocide	  will	  be	  such	  that	  it	  affects	  those	  two	  factors	  in	  that	  way,	  regardless	  of	  the	  quantitative	  distribution	  of	  that	  effect.	  Some	  sample	  values	  can	  be	  plugged	  into	  the	  equations	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point.	  Figure	  1	  shows	  a	  baseline	  for	  the	  two	  populations;	  R	  and	  m	  are	  the	  two	  parameters	  that	  will	  change.	  
	  
Figure	  1	  Now	  compare	  to	  Figure	  2,	  which	  is	  the	  graph	  for	  a	  light	  general	  biocide;	  this	  involves	  changing	  the	  relevant	  parameters	  slightly,	  so	  the	  predator	  death	  rate	  is	  higher	  and	  the	  prey	  birth	  rate	  is	  lower.	  Note	  how	  the	  peaks	  for	  the	  prey	  population	  have	  gotten	  higher,	  while	  the	  peaks	  for	  the	  predator	  population	  stay	  very	  close	  to	  what	  they	  were	  before.	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Figure	  2	  	  This	  illustrates	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  ratio	  of	  prey	  to	  predators;	  the	  frequency	  of	  oscillations	  has	  also	  changed,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  ratio.	  The	  effect	  is	  more	  pronounced	  with	  a	  massive	  biocide,	  in	  Figure	  3.	  
	  
Figure	  3	  	  The	  prey	  population	  peaks	  are	  strikingly	  higher	  than	  in	  figure	  1;	  the	  predator	  population	  peaks	  have	  dropped	  significantly.	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We	  have	  something	  here	  that	  looks	  distinctively	  mathematical.	  The	  modal	  force	  of	  the	  ‘must’	  by	  which	  a	  general	  biocide	  must	  increase	  the	  relative	  proportion	  of	  prey	  to	  predators	  is	  stronger	  than	  any	  causal	  relationship.	  It	  will	  hold	  of	  any	  possible	  causal	  relationship	  that	  instantiates	  those	  equations.	  But,	  the	  key	  question	  is,	  if	  this	  is	  a	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanation,	  of	  what	  is	  it	  an	  explanation?	  The	  examples	  we’ve	  just	  seen	  in	  the	  figures	  involve	  toy	  values	  –	  they	  were	  made	  up	  to	  provide	  a	  baseline	  and	  to	  illustrate	  how	  changing	  the	  predator	  death	  rate	  and	  prey	  birth	  rate	  changed	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  average	  populations.	  There	  is	  nothing	  in	  the	  world	  that	  is	  being	  modeled	  by	  this	  toy	  example	  using	  these	  values.	  Yet,	  there	  is	  something	  undeniably	  explanatory	  about	  comparing	  those	  three	  graphs	  in	  terms	  of	  understanding	  the	  changes	  to	  them	  resulting	  from	  a	  general	  biocide.	  If	  there	  are	  any	  systems	  in	  the	  world	  of	  which	  this	  toy	  model	  holds,	  then	  we	  already	  have	  in	  hand	  a	  powerful	  explanation	  that	  constrains	  the	  possible	  causal	  mechanisms	  in	  such	  a	  system:	  they	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  violate	  this	  principle.	  
4.2	  Two	  ways	  a	  model	  can	  hold,	  yielding	  causal	  versus	  mathematical	  
explanations	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  contrast	  I	  want	  to	  draw	  between	  two	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  L-­‐V	  model	  can	  hold	  of	  a	  system.	  The	  first,	  which	  is	  causal	  on	  both	  the	  narrow	  and	  broad	  construal,	  involves	  starting	  with	  a	  particular	  system	  in	  the	  world,	  such	  a	  given	  population	  of	  moose	  and	  wolves,	  modeling	  it	  as	  accurately	  as	  we	  can,	  and	  seeing	  what	  comes	  out	  of	  it.	  By	  starting	  with	  a	  particular	  system,	  modeling	  it,	  and	  finding	  that	  the	  L-­‐V	  equations	  hold	  of	  the	  system,	  we	  end	  up	  with	  a	  causal	  model	  of	  the	  system,	  and	  a	  merely	  representational	  relationship	  between	  the	  model	  and	  the	  system.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  in	  this	  case	  that	  the	  resulting	  model	  would	  apply	  elsewhere,	  or	  to	  assume	  similar	  outcomes	  for	  another	  system	  with	  broadly	  similar	  mechanisms.	  If	  we	  find	  out	  that	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  of	  this	  system	  are	  such	  that	  under	  some	  circumstances,	  the	  model	  fails	  to	  hold,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  develop	  a	  different	  model	  for	  this	  system,	  not	  choose	  a	  different	  system.	  	  It	  could	  turn	  out	  that	  this	  model	  does	  not	  apply,	  or	  that	  we	  could	  change	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  system	  such	  that	  it	  no	  longer	  does:	  this	  means	  that	  the	  explanation,	  why	  a	  general	  biocide	  in	  that	  population	  results	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  prey	  to	  predators,	  does	  not	  have	  the	  modal	  force	  of	  a	  mathematical	  explanation.	  It	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  hold	  of	  the	  causal	  relationships	  when	  the	  model	  holds	  of	  the	  system	  in	  this	  way.	  They	  could	  be	  found,	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Volterra	  principle	  in	  this	  system,	  to	  violate	  the	  L-­‐V	  equations	  instead.	  Insofar	  as	  it	  does	  hold,	  it	  holds	  with	  the	  contingency	  associated	  with	  causal	  explanations,	  not	  with	  the	  stronger	  necessity	  of	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mathematical	  ones.	  It	  is	  a	  situating	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  that	  starts	  with	  a	  specific	  chunk	  of	  the	  network	  and	  then	  tries	  to	  find	  a	  model	  that	  holds	  of	  it	  well	  enough.	  In	  contrast,	  if	  we	  start	  with	  the	  toy	  model,	  in	  which	  we	  know	  with	  mathematical	  certainty	  that	  the	  Volterra	  Principle	  holds,	  we	  can	  then	  go	  looking	  for	  some	  part	  of	  the	  world	  of	  which	  it	  might	  hold.	  This	  turns	  out	  to	  license	  a	  host	  of	  additional	  explanatory	  resources,	  including	  ones	  that	  have	  the	  modal	  force	  of	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations.	  If	  the	  model	  holds	  of	  some	  chunk	  of	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations,	  that	  of	  which	  it	  holds	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  Volterra	  Principle.	  We	  know,	  before	  ever	  finding	  such	  a	  system,	  that	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  system	  must	  yield	  that	  result.	  This	  is	  because	  we	  are	  picking	  out	  the	  system(s)	  in	  question	  because	  they	  conform	  to	  the	  L-­‐V	  equations.	  This	  is	  an	  entirely	  different	  use	  of	  the	  model	  than	  when	  we	  start	  with	  a	  system	  and	  build	  a	  model	  for	  it.	  In	  this	  second	  approach,	  the	  model	  is	  already	  in	  hand,	  and	  we	  go	  looking	  for	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  to	  which	  it	  fits,	  such	  that	  the	  group	  of	  systems	  that	  is	  found	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  model	  must	  have	  specific	  features	  such	  that	  they	  are	  those	  systems	  to	  which	  it	  fits.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  starting	  with	  a	  system,	  it	  could	  turn	  out	  that	  the	  model	  developed	  to	  represent	  it	  fails.	  This	  is	  a	  representational	  failure,	  and	  means	  that	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  the	  model	  needn’t	  apply	  to	  the	  system	  itself.	  But	  when	  we	  start	  with	  the	  model	  and	  then	  pick	  out	  only	  those	  systems	  to	  which	  it	  applies,	  we	  don’t	  get	  representational	  failures,	  because	  by	  definition	  only	  those	  systems	  to	  which	  it	  actually	  applies	  were	  picked	  out.	  Failure	  for	  it	  to	  apply	  doesn’t	  mean	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  the	  model	  don’t	  fit	  the	  systems	  it	  models,	  it	  means	  that	  this	  system	  is	  not	  such	  a	  system.	  	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  the	  chunk	  of	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  being	  considered	  is	  held	  fixed,	  and	  if	  the	  equations	  do	  not	  apply,	  we	  need	  different	  equations.	  In	  the	  second,	  the	  equations	  are	  held	  fixed,	  and	  if	  one	  part	  of	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  doesn’t	  fit	  those	  equations,	  we	  move	  on	  to	  another	  part	  of	  the	  network.	  By	  contrasting	  these	  two	  cases,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  modified	  definition	  of	  the	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanation	  at	  play.	  If	  the	  conditions	  are	  met,	  namely,	  if	  this	  model	  holds	  of	  a	  system	  in	  the	  world,	  then	  such	  a	  system	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  Volterra	  Principle.	  	  That	  the	  model	  holds	  already	  provides	  explanatory	  traction	  on	  that	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  was	  previously	  merely	  representational	  but	  not	  yet	  explanatory.	  This	  is	  a	  way	  of	  situating	  the	  model	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  by	  selectively	  picking	  out	  pieces	  of	  that	  network	  such	  that	  the	  pieces	  of	  the	  network	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thus	  picked	  are	  governed	  by	  the	  mathematical	  relationships	  of	  the	  model	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  modally	  stronger	  than	  merely	  identifying	  instances	  of	  a	  particular	  causal	  relation.	  The	  model	  holds	  of	  that	  set	  of	  systems	  differently	  than	  it	  holds	  of	  a	  system	  that	  was	  found	  to	  follow	  the	  equations.	  On	  the	  broad	  construal,	  both	  of	  these	  modeling	  scenarios	  involve	  causal	  explanation,	  because	  they	  are	  about	  a	  causal	  system.	  On	  the	  narrow	  construal,	  the	  first	  is	  a	  causal	  explanation	  involving	  situating	  the	  L-­‐V	  model	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations.	  One	  could	  find	  that	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  causal	  relations	  in	  the	  system	  constitute	  a	  general	  biocide	  and	  that	  the	  system	  itself	  thus	  conforms	  to	  the	  Volterra	  principle.	  	  But	  the	  second	  way	  of	  using	  the	  model	  is	  not	  providing	  a	  narrow	  causal	  explanation	  when	  we	  say	  that	  the	  Volterra	  Principle	  holds,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  also	  a	  way	  of	  situating	  the	  model	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations,	  and	  even	  though	  it	  is	  explanatory	  of	  the	  system	  in	  the	  world	  thus	  identified	  to	  say	  that	  the	  L-­‐V	  equations	  hold	  of	  it.	  The	  Volterra	  Principle	  must	  hold,	  with	  a	  mathematical	  and	  not	  causal	  degree	  of	  necessity,	  in	  any	  system	  we	  identify	  to	  which	  this	  model	  applies.	  When	  we	  start	  from	  a	  mathematical	  relationship	  within	  a	  model	  that	  is	  being	  considered	  separate	  from	  particular	  systems,	  it	  is	  explanatory	  of	  these	  systems	  to	  which	  it	  applies	  that	  the	  model	  holds	  of	  them.	  It	  is	  putting	  all	  such	  systems	  together	  into	  a	  special	  type,	  that	  of	  the	  systems	  of	  which	  this	  model	  holds.	  It	  situates	  the	  model	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  in	  the	  world	  such	  that	  we	  can	  then	  make	  further	  claims	  about	  any	  system	  of	  that	  type,	  since	  that	  type	  is	  defined	  as	  any	  system	  of	  which	  this	  particular	  model	  holds.	  	  Construing	  causal	  explanation	  narrowly	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  this	  useful	  distinction	  between	  ways	  of	  building	  or	  deploying	  a	  model.	  It	  highlights	  the	  intriguing	  and	  distinctive	  character	  of	  the	  explanation	  that	  general	  biocide	  results	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  prey	  to	  predators:	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  that	  there	  are	  causal	  structures	  described	  by	  these	  equations,	  but	  that	  any	  causal	  structures	  described	  by	  these	  equations	  must	  conform	  to	  this	  principle,	  no	  matter	  how	  differently	  they	  are	  implemented	  in	  terms	  of	  mechanistic	  detail.	  There	  are	  substantive	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  met	  for	  the	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanation	  to	  hold	  –	  it	  does	  not	  apply	  under	  any	  circumstances,	  which	  is	  why	  it	  requires	  amending	  Lange’s	  original	  characterization	  –	  but	  once	  those	  conditions	  are	  met,	  it	  carries	  a	  distinctive	  modal	  necessity	  with	  it.	  We	  discover	  something	  about	  the	  world	  by	  finding	  that	  this	  model	  holds	  of	  a	  particular	  system,	  and	  this	  allows	  us	  to	  recognize	  two	  ways	  of	  making	  such	  a	  discovery:	  by	  starting	  with	  the	  system	  and	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finding	  that	  the	  model	  holds,	  or	  starting	  with	  the	  model,	  and	  finding	  a	  part	  of	  the	  world	  of	  which	  it	  holds.	  This	  also	  illustrates	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  grain-­‐focusing	  metaphor	  for	  discussions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  models	  in	  explanation.	  Does	  the	  L-­‐V	  model	  provide	  mathematical	  or	  causal	  explanations?	  This	  is	  not	  yet	  a	  sufficiently	  well-­‐defined	  question	  –	  it	  can	  be	  used	  for	  either,	  depending	  on	  the	  specific	  explanandum	  in	  question.	  The	  model	  itself	  is	  neither	  intrinsically	  causal	  or	  non-­‐causal.	  Applied	  in	  one	  way,	  to	  one	  part	  of	  the	  causal	  network,	  it	  yields	  mathematical	  explanations;	  applied	  a	  different	  way,	  to	  a	  different	  part	  of	  the	  network,	  it	  yields	  causal	  explanations.	  	  	  
5. Four	  Complementary	  Relationships	  Between	  Mathematical	  and	  Causal	  
Explanation	  There	  are	  (at	  least)	  four	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  causal	  and	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  can	  complement	  one	  another	  in	  terms	  of	  filling	  out	  a	  richer	  explanatory	  picture	  of	  a	  target	  phenomenon.4	  Some	  of	  these	  points	  also	  apply	  directly	  to	  or	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  non-­‐causal	  explanation.	  I’ll	  focus	  on	  the	  complementary	  roles	  for	  distinctively	  mathematical	  and	  causal	  explanations	  here,	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  example	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  	  There	  is	  a	  weaker	  and	  a	  stronger	  version	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  these	  explanations	  complement	  rather	  than	  compete,	  and	  in	  what	  follows	  I	  argue	  for	  both.	  The	  weaker	  claim	  is	  that	  a	  more	  precise	  specification	  of	  a	  broad	  but	  fuzzy	  explanandum	  results	  in	  closely	  related	  but	  nonidentically	  formulated	  explananda,	  each	  of	  which	  will	  thus	  involve	  a	  slightly	  different	  explanans.	  The	  resulting	  explanans	  fill	  out	  a	  richer	  picture	  of	  the	  original	  fuzzily	  formulated	  explananda	  as	  comprised	  of	  these	  more	  specific	  explananda.	  The	  stronger	  claim	  is	  that	  there	  may	  be	  times	  when	  a	  single	  well-­‐specified	  explanandum	  itself	  is	  amenable	  to	  both	  mathematical	  and	  causal	  explanation.	  This	  is	  an	  extremely	  interesting	  situation,	  where	  two	  distinct	  explanatory	  perspectives	  can	  be	  taken	  on	  a	  single	  explanandum.	  	  
5.1	  Slight	  reformulations	  of	  explananda	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  These	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  exhaustive	  or	  exclusive.	  My	  goal	  is	  to	  pick	  out	  some	  central	  avenues	  for	  complementary	  roles	  with	  sufficient	  richness	  of	  detail	  to	  enable	  identification	  of	  such	  instances.	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The	  first	  complementary	  role	  for	  distinctively	  mathematical	  and	  causal	  explanation	  is	  simply	  that	  where	  slight	  reformulations	  of	  the	  explanandum	  pivot	  between	  a	  causal	  and	  mathematical	  explanation.	  In	  the	  L-­‐V	  example	  above,	  one	  can	  consider	  two	  different	  explananda:	  one	  is	  the	  behavior	  of	  this	  system,	  to	  which	  the	  L-­‐V	  equations	  can	  be	  applied;	  another	  is	  any	  system	  to	  which	  the	  L-­‐V	  equations	  can	  be	  applied.	  Similar	  explanations	  can	  be	  given,	  using	  the	  L-­‐V	  model,	  of	  behavior	  in	  the	  specific	  system	  being	  modeled	  and	  in	  the	  class	  of	  systems	  to	  which	  the	  model	  applies.	  But	  they	  are	  not	  identical	  explanations,	  since	  they	  will	  involve	  slightly	  different	  explanans	  according	  to	  the	  slight	  differences	  in	  explananda.	  A	  particular	  population	  of	  moose	  and	  wolves	  on	  a	  single	  island	  in	  a	  wilderness	  area	  might	  be	  one	  of	  which	  the	  L-­‐V	  equations	  hold	  such	  the	  changes	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years	  in	  their	  populations	  can	  be	  causally	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  model.	  Or,	  that	  their	  populations	  changes	  have	  been	  tied	  together	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  have	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  showing	  that	  this	  island	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  those	  equations.	  	  Finding	  the	  precise	  boundaries	  across	  which	  slight	  reformulations	  of	  explananda	  shift	  between	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  gives	  us	  further	  insight	  into	  the	  overall	  phenomenon	  of	  which	  they	  are	  reformulations.	  
5.2	  Causal	  distortion	  of	  idealized	  mathematical	  models	  A	  second	  complementary	  role	  can	  be	  that	  of	  providing	  a	  causal	  explanation	  of	  why	  a	  particular	  non-­‐causal	  explanation	  doesn’t	  hold,	  or	  only	  holds	  to	  a	  low	  degree.	  For	  instance,	  we	  might	  find	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  predator-­‐prey	  populations	  that	  initially	  seem	  like	  good	  candidates	  for	  modeling	  using	  the	  L-­‐V	  equations.	  However,	  it	  can	  turn	  out	  that	  this	  particular	  set	  of	  populations	  are	  not	  very	  well	  modeled	  by	  these	  equations,	  because	  there	  is	  something	  further	  causal	  factor(s)	  not	  included	  in	  the	  equations	  but	  which	  have	  a	  relevant	  effect	  on	  population	  dynamics.	  The	  way(s)	  in	  which	  the	  mathematics	  does	  not	  do	  an	  adequate	  job	  representing	  the	  actual	  system	  can	  be	  itself	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  those	  additional	  causal	  factors	  and	  the	  way(s)	  in	  which	  they	  affect	  the	  solutions	  to	  the	  original	  equations.	  In	  the	  moose-­‐wolf	  case,	  a	  particular	  island	  might	  have	  otherwise	  been	  well-­‐modeled	  by	  these	  equations,	  except	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  hunters	  that	  regularly	  cull	  a	  specific	  number	  of	  moose,	  which	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  equations	  and	  is	  not	  tied	  to	  the	  population	  of	  moose.	  This	  can	  be	  especially	  enlightening	  if	  the	  L-­‐V	  equations	  can	  partially	  model	  the	  system:	  if	  they	  get	  some	  explanatory	  traction	  on	  what	  is	  going	  on,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  fail	  to	  explain	  more	  than	  they	  do	  is	  itself	  a	  target	  for	  explanation	  in	  terms	  of	  additional	  causal	  relations.	  The	  equations	  might	  be	  good	  enough	  up	  to	  a	  limit	  in	  terms	  of	  numerical	  accuracy,	  or	  they	  might	  be	  good	  but	  only	  under	  a	  constrained	  set	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of	  conditions,	  such	  that	  causal	  details	  provide	  information	  about	  the	  system	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  will	  break	  down,	  et	  cetera.	  
5.3	  Partial	  explanations	  requiring	  supplementation	  A	  third	  complementary	  role	  involves	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  that	  provide	  a	  genuine	  explanation	  of	  some	  phenomenon,	  but	  only	  a	  partial	  one.	  This	  is	  different	  than	  failing	  to	  apply;	  a	  mathematical	  explanation	  might	  explain	  some	  part	  of	  the	  explanandum,	  but	  require	  supplementation	  to	  adequately	  account	  for	  what	  happens.	  Often	  a	  number	  of	  different	  elements	  must	  be	  taken	  together	  to	  constitute	  a	  full	  explanation;	  some	  of	  those	  elements	  may	  be	  distinctively	  mathematical,	  right	  alongside	  straightforwardly	  causal	  ones.	  For	  instance,	  a	  classic	  example	  of	  mathematical	  explanation	  is	  that	  of	  the	  prime	  year	  life	  cycle	  of	  the	  cicada	  (Baker	  [2005],	  [2009];	  Saatsi	  [forthcoming]).	  It	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  predators	  of	  cicadas	  to	  time	  their	  own	  reproductive	  cycles	  to	  that	  of	  their	  prey	  cicadas	  when	  the	  cicadas	  reproduce	  in	  prime	  year	  life	  cycles.	  The	  explanation	  involves	  pointing	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  primes	  are	  divisible	  only	  by	  themselves	  and	  one;	  odd	  numbers	  like	  nine	  could	  still	  let	  a	  predator	  with	  a	  three	  year	  reproductive	  cycle	  capitalize	  on	  the	  bounty	  of	  cicadas	  every	  three	  generations,	  whereas	  a	  thirteen	  year	  cicada	  cycle	  does	  not	  allow	  that.	  	  This	  is	  certainly	  some	  kind	  of	  explanation	  of	  why	  cicadas	  have	  a	  prime	  year	  life	  cycle,	  rather	  than	  even	  or	  non-­‐prime	  odd	  year	  life	  cycles.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  a	  complete	  explanation.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  supplemented	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  other	  explanations	  in	  order	  to	  finish	  the	  explanatory	  task	  (Lehmann-­‐Ziebarth	  et	  al.,	  [2005]).	  This	  includes	  information	  such	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  cicadas,	  and	  not	  other	  insect	  species,	  have	  a	  safe	  place	  for	  larvae	  to	  wait	  for	  that	  many	  years	  without	  getting	  eaten	  and	  with	  sufficient	  nourishment	  that	  nymphs	  don’t	  compete	  with	  one	  another.	  Bees	  could	  not	  implement	  a	  prime	  year	  life	  cycle	  like	  this,	  even	  if	  it	  would	  be	  equally	  advantageous	  for	  them	  to	  avoid	  predation.	  Other	  insects	  might	  have	  also	  benefited	  from	  such	  a	  life	  cycle,	  and	  had	  the	  right	  conditions	  for	  larvae,	  but	  not	  had	  the	  requisite	  genetic	  possibilities	  to	  actually	  evolve	  such	  a	  life	  cycle.	  As	  such,	  part	  of	  the	  total	  explanation	  of	  why	  cicadas	  have	  a	  prime	  year	  life	  cycle	  involves	  distinctive	  mathematical	  features	  of	  prime	  numbers;	  but	  a	  more	  complete	  explanation	  of	  that	  phenomenon	  must	  involve	  causal	  explanations	  as	  well.	  
5.4	  Explanatory	  dimensionality	  Finally,	  a	  fourth	  complementary	  role	  for	  distinctively	  mathematical	  and	  causal	  explanations	  comes	  closest	  to	  what	  one	  might	  have	  thought	  would	  be	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competition	  because	  they	  are	  explanations	  of	  the	  very	  same	  explanandum.	  Rather	  than	  competing,	  however,	  these	  explanations	  provide	  a	  powerful	  and	  underappreciated	  dimensionality	  to	  their	  explanandum.	  This	  fourth	  complementary	  role	  involves	  causal	  explanations	  that	  illustrate,	  instantiate,	  or	  fall	  under	  a	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanation.	  A	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanation	  provides	  limits	  on	  the	  space	  of	  possible	  causal	  structures	  that	  could	  be	  involved	  in	  a	  given	  explanandum:	  only	  those	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  mathematically	  possible	  could	  be	  realized,	  and	  any	  within	  the	  bounds	  delineated	  mathematically	  would	  suffice.	  Every	  causal	  system	  of	  the	  relevant	  sort	  must	  conform,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  locatable	  somewhere	  in	  that	  space	  of	  possibility.	  	  Such	  a	  mathematical	  explanation	  explains	  not	  merely	  particular	  instances	  of	  that	  kind	  of	  system,	  but	  also	  situates	  different	  instances	  in	  the	  same	  space	  of	  possible	  structure.	  Adding	  a	  causal	  explanation	  involves	  picking	  out	  some	  proper	  subset	  within	  the	  mathematically	  delineated	  bounds.	  It	  provides	  further	  explanation	  of	  some	  particular	  causal	  system	  to	  see	  how	  it	  fits	  in	  that	  space	  of	  possibility,	  how	  distinct	  but	  related	  systems	  fill	  out,	  or	  fail	  to	  fill	  out,	  that	  space	  of	  possibility,	  and	  to	  see	  how	  those	  systems	  evolve	  through	  the	  space	  of	  possible	  causal	  structures	  through	  time.	  	  The	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  provide	  the	  underlying	  topography	  over	  which	  the	  actual	  causal	  systems	  are	  laid	  and	  across	  which	  they	  traverse	  through	  time.	  Picking	  out	  one	  of	  the	  systems	  to	  which	  the	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanation	  applies,	  it	  is	  explanatorily	  illuminating	  to	  see	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  system’s	  causal	  structure,	  including	  mechanistic	  detail,	  conforms	  to	  or	  implements	  the	  spare	  equations	  of	  the	  model.	  The	  same	  phenomenon,	  the	  behavior	  of	  those	  predator	  and	  prey	  populations	  in	  the	  system,	  is	  grouped	  as	  a	  single	  instance	  that	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  two	  distinct	  types,	  such	  that	  distinct	  explanations	  are	  provided	  by	  situating	  the	  system	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  each	  type.	  In	  one	  case,	  it	  is	  picked	  out	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  type	  of	  system	  to	  which	  the	  equations	  apply,	  such	  that	  its	  behavior	  can	  be	  held	  up	  to	  that	  of	  other	  systems	  picked	  out	  by	  the	  same	  criteria,	  to	  see	  how	  it	  is	  similar	  and	  in	  what	  regards	  it	  differs.	  But	  it	  can	  also	  be	  picked	  out	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  detailed	  causal	  structure	  of	  that	  system,	  which	  may	  differ	  relevantly	  from	  the	  other	  systems,	  and	  which	  may	  group	  this	  system	  into	  a	  different	  type	  in	  terms	  of	  causal	  detail.	  It	  is	  the	  same	  token,	  considered	  as	  instances	  of	  different	  types.	  	  Picking	  out	  a	  part	  of	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  and	  zooming	  in	  to	  get	  more	  details	  about	  its	  causal	  structure,	  versus	  picking	  out	  a	  part	  of	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations	  as	  one	  instance	  of	  a	  type	  that	  is	  found	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  network	  of	  causal	  relations:	  this	  is	  a	  complementary	  way	  for	  two	  kinds	  of	  explanations	  to	  illuminate	  the	  same	  explanandum.	  Taking	  the	  causal	  and	  mathematical	  explanatory	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perspectives	  on	  the	  very	  same	  explanandum	  yields	  a	  powerful	  dimensionality	  that	  neither	  kind	  of	  explanation	  could	  provide	  alone.	  These	  are	  not	  an	  exhaustive	  or	  exclusive	  list	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  causal	  and	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  can	  complement	  one	  another.	  And	  again,	  non-­‐causal	  explanation	  is	  a	  heterogeneous	  category	  such	  that	  other	  non-­‐causal	  explanations	  besides	  distinctively	  mathematical	  ones	  can	  complement	  in	  yet	  further	  ways.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  distinctively	  mathematical	  and	  causal	  explanations	  are	  not	  in	  explanatory	  competition	  for	  explananda:	  rather,	  when	  taken	  together,	  they	  fill	  out	  a	  richer	  view	  of	  their	  explananda.	  	  
6. Conclusion	  Distinguishing	  causal	  explanation	  more	  sharply	  and	  precisely	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  explanation	  by	  restricting	  what	  counts	  as	  causal	  has	  the	  perhaps	  unexpected	  consequence	  of	  strengthening	  causal	  explanation.	  Such	  clarification	  avoids	  lumping	  together	  other	  kinds	  of	  explanation,	  such	  as	  constitutive	  or	  mathematical,	  with	  causal;	  it	  means	  more	  to	  provide	  a	  causal	  explanation,	  rather	  than	  reducing	  causal	  explanation	  to	  a	  synonym	  for	  explanation	  in	  general.	  On	  a	  broad	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation,	  arguably	  anything	  with	  empirical	  content	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  causal,	  and	  labeling	  an	  explanation	  as	  ‘causal’	  consequently	  comes	  to	  mean	  little	  or	  nothing	  about	  that	  explanation.	  On	  a	  narrow	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation,	  though,	  adding	  the	  label	  ‘causal’	  to	  an	  explanation	  adds	  substantive	  information	  about	  what	  is	  doing	  the	  explanatory	  work.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  causal	  explanations	  are	  a	  more	  homogenous	  category.	  The	  difference	  between	  a	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  explanation	  often	  turns	  on	  precise	  ways	  of	  formulating	  the	  explanandum	  in	  question:	  one	  way	  will	  require	  an	  explanans	  that	  is	  causally	  upstream	  of	  the	  explanandum,	  while	  a	  slight	  shift	  in	  formulation	  will	  change	  the	  explanandum	  sufficiently	  that	  a	  nearby	  non-­‐causal	  explanans	  pops	  into	  focus.	  Imprecise	  formulation	  of	  explananda	  reduces	  the	  explanatory	  resources	  at	  our	  disposal	  by	  flattening	  genuinely	  different	  explanatory	  relationships	  into	  one	  generic	  category.	  Distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations	  are	  those	  where	  the	  modal	  force	  of	  the	  explanation	  is	  stronger	  than	  any	  causal	  explanation	  could	  provide	  –	  it	  constrains	  all	  possible	  causal	  structures.	  Drawing	  on	  Lange	  ([2013]),	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  we	  should	  amend	  the	  characterization	  of	  distinctively	  causal	  explanations.	  Some	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mathematical	  explanations	  hold	  anywhere,	  always,	  under	  all	  conditions,	  such	  as	  twenty-­‐three	  not	  being	  evenly	  divisible	  by	  three.	  But	  some	  apply	  once	  certain	  conditions	  are	  met,	  such	  as	  the	  condition	  that	  a	  given	  model	  such	  as	  Lotka-­‐Volterra	  hold	  of	  the	  system.	  Once	  those	  conditions	  are	  met,	  some	  explanations	  have	  the	  modal	  necessity	  associated	  with	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanations,	  stronger	  than	  that	  of	  causal	  explanations.	  ‘Holding	  of’	  is	  thus	  a	  relation	  that	  can,	  under	  some	  circumstances,	  pack	  explanatory	  punch	  separately	  from	  the	  causal	  relations	  involved.	  	  By	  combining	  a	  narrow	  construal	  of	  causal	  explanation	  with	  a	  broader	  construal	  of	  distinctively	  mathematical	  explanation,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  there	  are	  (at	  least)	  two	  distinct	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  model	  might	  hold	  of	  a	  system.	  Considering	  the	  toy	  version	  of	  the	  Lotka-­‐Volterra	  equations	  highlights	  different	  ways	  of	  situating	  that	  same	  model	  against	  the	  background	  framework	  of	  causal	  relations.	  Each	  distinct	  way	  of	  situating	  the	  model	  will	  result	  in	  different	  explanatory	  resources	  that	  can	  be	  used	  from	  the	  model	  for	  the	  system	  of	  which	  it	  holds.	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